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The purpose of ‘resettlement’ is to help prisoners deal with problems that have contributed
to their offending. These can include issues such as health, education, criminal attitudes,
relationships and employment. Resettlement services are therefore an important part of helping
to reduce re-offending behaviours and it is a considerable challenge for the Northern Ireland
Prison Service (NIPS) to deliver them effectively. This inspection is a follow-up to the last
report on the Northern Ireland Prisoner Resettlement Strategy completed in 2007.
The context for resettlement has changed considerably with the commencement of the
Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. It requires prisoners to address their offending
behaviours if they are to persuade the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland (PCNI)
that they can be safely released. In turn the NIPS need to provide more opportunities for
these prisoners to undertake offending behaviour programmes that will enable them to
resettle successfully.
The inspection report shows the resettlement process has benefitted from the resources that
were provided to implement the Criminal Justice Order. Improvements have been indentified in
relation to the appointment of additional staff, co-located offender management teams that were
working well together, a better environment for some life sentence prisoners, better engagement
with the voluntary and community sector and greater effort to address the resettlement needs
of short-term and remand prisoners.
Whilst the resettlement process had improved, better outcomes for prisoners were less obvious.
This was partly a reflection of the NIPS inclination to measure inputs rather than outcomes which
are the real test of whether services are being delivered successfully. In addition the successful
delivery of resettlement remained hampered by working practices within the Service and its
dominant security ethos. Every aspect of prisoner life contributes to the resettlement agenda
and it is important that the Strategic Efficiency and Effectiveness (SEE) programme currently being
developed by the Prison Service to enable reform, explicitly deals with the resettlement agenda.
Our recommendations for change need to be folded into the reform agenda.
The inspection was carried out by Tom McGonigle of CJI. My thanks to all those who
participated in the inspection process.
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Executive Summary
The last inspection report on the Northern Ireland Prisoner Resettlement Strategy was issued in
June 2007. The Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) accepted the 17 recommendations that
related to them and published an Action Plan for their implementation. By Spring 2011 when
this inspection took place, the Resettlement Strategy had been subsumed within a new set of
arrangements for Offender Management (OM). This inspection sought to establish the extent
to which the NIPS had fulfilled its responsibilities for prisoner resettlement since the 2007
inspection and we took account of the OM context which has become a major feature of the
NIPS operation.
The inspection was scheduled for Summer 2010 but delayed at the request of the NIPS as they
wanted to relaunch the Multi-Agency Steering Group that oversaw resettlement, introduce an
updated Resettlement Pathways document in Autumn 2010 and undertake a self-audit prior
to the inspection. However by the time we inspected there was still no strategic body to
oversee resettlement, and the launch of the updated Pathways Strategy had been delayed
until Summer 2011.
The context for resettlement had changed significantly with the commencement of the Criminal
Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (the CJO), the legislation that underpinned the OM
process. The CJO required prisoners to address their offending behaviour if they were to
persuade the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland (PCNI) that they could be safely
released. In turn, the NIPS had to provide more opportunities for these prisoners to undertake
offending behaviour and other programmes that would enable them to resettle successfully.
A major implementation programme was established to manage the new sentences and the
resettlement process benefitted from the resources that were provided to implement the CJO.
Early indications were that the NIPS was under pressure to meet the expectations of the
CJO as the numbers of licensed prisoners being recalled to prison were higher than they had
expected. There was also additional pressure as the overall prison population increased steadily.
In particular, the NIPS was struggling to meet the requirements of the Parole Commissioners.
The NIPS was alert to the risk that non-CJO prisoners (those on short sentences, remandees
and fine defaulters) could lose out on resettlement services as attention focused on CJO and
life prisoners, and they were working to alleviate this risk.
Eight of the 14 recommendations that were still relevant had not been achieved, though there had
been structural and practical progress. This included:
• additional Probation Officers and NIPS staff had been appointed. Over half the personnel
employed in OM and resettlement work were non-NIPS employees; and the NIPS officers
were volunteers for OM roles;
• the OM Teams, which also included psychologists, voluntary and community sector (VCS)
personnel and chaplains were co-located in dedicated offices. This integration was working
well and there was good cross-fertilisation of values and working practices;
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• no females under the age of 18 had been held in Ash House since 2009, and the regime for
women prisoners had improved;
• many life prisoners now had a better environment in Braid House and a few had even been
transferred to Magilligan;
• prison officers designated as ‘sentence managers’ were the closest the NIPS has come to
providing personal officers, and more prisoners were aware of their resettlement plans;
• a set of standards had been prepared to guide delivery of the new sentences. These were
specifically written to suit prison officers;
• the Prisoner Record Information Systems Management (PRISM) system had been significantly
re-developed. It was beginning to generate more powerful data on matters such as prisoner
needs’ profiles. Inspectors saw the data being used to hold managers accountable;
• there were more focused service level agreements with VCS organisations, providing clearer
accountability in both directions;
• drugs and alcohol services delivery had become more consistent with a single agency
providing interventions in each of the prisons;
• greater effort was being invested in addressing the resettlement needs of short-term and
remand prisoners; and
• prisoners could now be placed on the Electoral Register and open bank accounts before
release.
While resettlement processes had developed, better outcomes for prisoners were less
obvious, hence the limited achievement of previous recommendations which had targeted better
outcomes.This was partly a reflection of the NIPS inclination to measure inputs rather than
outcomes, which is also apparent in the ‘delivery’ and ‘outcomes’ chapters of this report as much
more material was available in relation to the former.
Progress since 2007 was really let down by the context within which resettlement services were
delivered. Every aspect of prison life contributes to prisoners’ resettlement and many areas of
the NIPS performance were poor. Inadequate management and impoverished regimes have been
extensively reported on in the past. Inspections have shown that the NIPS is very expensive, yet
leadership of resettlement and staffing deployment remained ineffective at the time of this
inspection. Working practices that were designed to suit staff and the dominant security ethos
impacted negatively on many commendable resettlement efforts.
Not surprisingly resettlement practice was best at Magilligan, a relatively small prison which held
only sentenced prisoners. Hydebank Wood had high levels of need among its women, young men
and juveniles who were both on remand and sentenced. Maghaberry had the largest numbers
and high levels of turnover, a disproportionate number of remand prisoners plus a small
separated population that drained staff resources from other functions of the prison including
resettlement.
From the prisoners’ perspective, there were a lot of issues to be addressed before they could
concentrate on resettlement work. These included their court cases, the prison regime, group
living pressures, transfers within and between prisons, and their personal relationships and health.
Most prisoners were more aware of resettlement than in 2007, but they remained uncertain
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about how it could help them. There were plenty of well-motivated staff involved, but they
needed to make the shift to really understanding the prisoners’ perspective and to progress
beyond ticking boxes.
The NIPS cannot deliver resettlement alone. It is obliged to work with whoever the courts send
into its custody, and it is very difficult to ‘resettle’ people whose lives were frequently in chaos
before entering prison. The concept of encouraging and promoting prisoners’ citizenship rather
than reducing it, and providing them with the rights - apart from their liberty - of free citizens,
remains a political and societal challenge.
There are issues for politicians, other Government agencies and wider society to address. In this
respect there is considerable scope to reduce the Northern Ireland prison population by
speeding up the process of justice for remand prisoners, and by reducing the numbers of fine
defaulters and male children entering prison. These reductions would impact positively on the
resettlement prospects of the remaining prisoner population.
However, immediate responsibility for resettlement lies with the NIPS. Our 22 recommendations
depend upon, and are linked to, wider NIPS reforms that are envisaged in its Strategic Efficiency
and Effectiveness (SEE) programme. Economics have become a major driver for change, and
major personnel changes are expected by April 2012. Governors have however guaranteed their
OM posts will be ringfenced, and our expectation is that the SEE programme will sufficiently
improve the regime, staffing and cultural contexts to strengthen delivery of resettlement services
in the future.
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Recommendations
Strategic Recommendations
• The DoJ should ensure that Supervised Activity Orders and other initiatives to divert fine
defaulters from custody are commenced by December 2012 (paragraph 1.20).
• A high level resettlement oversight group should be re-established by the NIPS by December
2011 comprising themselves, the PBNI, relevant Government departments and VCS providers.
It should meet at least annually and should apply a specific focus on the resettlement of
non-CJO and remand prisoners (paragraph 2.5).
• The DoJ should set and lead on an objective to improve cross-departmental contributions to
prisoner resettlement during the 2012-13 business year (paragraph 2.17).
• By April 2012 all male children who are sent into custody should be treated equally with
female children i.e. their default placement should be Woodlands JJC; and in the interim the
JJC should take a more central role in the YOC planning process for children.This should
include chairing the meetings. Terms of reference should be prepared for these meetings
whose primary purpose ought to be to establish the child’s suitability for transfer to the JJC,
and a robust quality assurance process should be introduced (paragraph 4.17).
Operational Recommendations
• The new Resettlement Pathways Strategy should incorporate a needs profile and identify
managerial responsibilities and timescales. It should include SMART targets that are based
upon outcomes for prisoners rather than NIPS inputs, and should link to individual
establishment resettlement strategies and to other relevant NIPS strategies, especially the
Offender Management model (paragraph 2.23).
• The NIPS should set a SMART target to extend the case management processes to a wider
range of prisoners, particularly short-term prisoners and remandees who regularly return to
custody (paragraph 3.22).
• The UK Border Agency should provide a minimum of four weeks notice to the NIPS of their
decision about whether or not prisoners will be deported at the end of their sentences
(paragraph 3.24).
• Criminal records and other information should be made available, where relevant and with
suitable protections built in, to partner agencies engaged in providing services to the NIPS
(paragraph 3.26).
• The NIPS SEE programme should ensure prisoners have an officer who takes a personal
interest in their case.This ought to be introduced on a phased basis for example starting with
life prisoners and extending to long-term remand prisoners (paragraph 3.54).
x• The NIPS should train staff to apply a more directive chairing and minuting style for individual
casework and committee level meetings, incorporating SMART objectives with built-in
accountability (paragraph 3.59).
• The NIPS should set targets to annually increase:
- the number of prisoners who receive accreditation for peer support roles; and
- the number of hours spent undertaking these roles (paragraph 3.64).
• Prisoners who deny their current offences should, where possible undertake programmes in
respect of previous convictions; more usage of rolling programmes should be introduced to
increase participation levels; and challenging targets should be set for completion of
programme suitability assessments (paragraph 3.69).
• The NIPS should extend its range of OBPs to include a domestic violence programme, an
internet sex offending programme and a programme for dangerous drivers (paragraph 3.70).
• The NIPS should set SMART targets to more expeditiously deploy and manage its psychology
personnel (paragraph 3.73).
• The NIPS should set targets to reduce security levels and deliver a more liberal regime for
lower security prisoners in each of its prisons (paragraph 3.81).
• The NIPS should determine and apply criteria that would enable sentenced prisoners to be
committed directly to Magilligan (paragraph 3.84).
• The NIPS should provide motivational interviewing training, initially for its OM staff;
and subsequently as part of any cultural change programme for the wider body of staff
(paragraph 4.6).
• Appropriate life prisoners should continue to be transferred to Magilligan if it helps to meet
their resettlement needs (paragraph 4.19).
• The new NIPS Resettlement Strategy should set specific targets for delivery of resettlement
services to separated prisoners (paragraph 4.24).
• The NIPS should set a target to increase its complement of Family Officers and to protect
their role (paragraph 4.27).
Repeated Recommendations
• The NIPS should set a SMART target to annually increase the numbers of prisoners families’
that contribute to the resettlement process (paragraph 3.50).
• Women prisoners should be accommodated on a separate site from young male prisoners
(paragraph 4.10).
1Inspection Report
1Section
2
31.1 Prisoner resettlement is a broad
concept, somewhat vague in character
but important in delivery. The Northern
Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) definition
of resettlement is ‘A systematic and
evidence-based process by which actions are
taken to work with the prisoner in custody
and on release... It encompasses the totality
of work with prisoners, their families and
significant others in partnership with
statutory and voluntary organisations.’
1.2 In effect the purpose of resettlement is
to help prisoners sort out problems
that have contributed to their offending.
If matters such as health, education,
criminal attitudes, relationships and
employment have been sorted out by
the time they leave custody then the
prospects of reduced re-offending are
much improved. This means every
branch of the NIPS has to deliver
effective services – a considerable
challenge given previous inspection
criticisms that have highlighted major
deficiencies and the need for a
substantial cultural shift within the NIPS.
The case for prisoner resettlement
1.3 The case for prisoner resettlement was
elevated to a position of priority in UK
penal policy by a 2002 Social Exclusion
Unit (SEU) report ‘Reducing re-offending
by ex-prisoners.’1 It established the
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framework for prisoner resettlement,
and the location of the SEU within the
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister,
enhancing the report’s political
influence, providing its authors with
an opportunity to adopt an approach
across eight Government departments,
some of which had previously regarded
prisoners as low priority.
1.4 The SEU report led to a national action
plan.The plan focused mainly on
practical services because it is problems
such as accommodation and finances
that are most pressing for people
coming out of prison. Being in
employment reduces the risk of
re-offending by between a third and a
half; while having stable accommodation
reduces the risk by a fifth. The SEU
report demonstrated the link between
social deprivation and offending
behaviour, and showed that good
outcomes for prisoners should translate
into less re-offending after release – a
prison sentence can be the first time
many prisoners have been in sustained
contact with public services, and often
the challenge is not to resettle prisoners
in society, but to settle them for the
first time. Table 1 taken from the SEU
report, provides clear evidence of the
need to offer prisoners resettlement
services.
1 Reducing re-offending by ex-prisoners, Social Exclusion Unit (2002).
41.5 We also know from more recent
Ministry of Justice publications that
short-term, and socially-deprived
prisoners have particularly high rates of
re-conviction. Sixty per cent of adults
serving sentences of less than 12
months are re-convicted within one year
of being released from prison. Re-
conviction rates are also consistently
higher for prisoners who experienced
violence as a child, were excluded from
school, had no qualifications,
accommodation or employment, and
abused drugs and alcohol.2 These
headlines mask another problem – for
each re-conviction it is estimated that
five recorded offences are committed.
As ex-prisoners are likely to be prolific
offenders the costs they incur will be
even higher. The annual cost of re-
offending by ex-prisoners to the
Northern Ireland criminal justice system
alone was estimated at around £80
million in CJI’s 2010 inspection of
Corporate Governance within the
Northern Ireland Prison Service.
1.6 The consequence of the SEU report
and others was that it made sense to
address prisoners’ resettlement needs,
and by 2009 the Chief Inspector of
Prisons for England and Wales was able
to report that “Resettlement, formerly an
add-on, is now seen as a core part of a
prison’s function.”
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1.7 Although this assertion showed that the
concept of resettlement had effectively
been accepted, it was qualified in some
important respects. Resettlement
policies were descriptive rather than
based on prisoners’ needs, resettlement
committees tended to lack a strategic
focus, and planning for short-term and
remand prisoners was deficient.
Table 1: Social characteristics of sentenced prisoners
Characteristic General Population Prisoner Population
Ran away from home as a child 11% 47% male; 57% female
Taken into care as a child 2% 27%
Regularly truanted from school 3% 30%
Excluded from school 2% 49% male; 33% female
No qualifications 15% 52% male; 71% female
Numeracy at or below Level 1 23% 65%
(level expected for an 11 year old)
Reading ability at or below Level 1 21-23% 48%
Unemployed 5% 67%*
Homeless 0.9% 32%
Suffer from two or more 5% men; 2% women 72% male; 70% female
mental disorders
Psychotic disorder 0.5% men; 0.6% women 7% male; 14% female
Drug use in the previous year 13% men; 8% women 66% male; 55% female
Hazardous drinking 38% men; 15% women 63% male; 39% female
2 Compendium of Re-offending Statistics and Analysis, Ministry of Justice, 4 November 2010.
3 HMIP Annual Report 2008-09.
* In the four weeks before imprisonment.
Prisoner resettlement in Northern
Ireland
1.8 The Northern Ireland Prisoner
Resettlement Strategy was generated by
Recommendation 208 of the Criminal
Justice Review in March 2000. In June
2004, the NIPS agreed a Resettlement
Strategy in partnership with the
Probation Board for Northern Ireland
(PBNI) plus a number of other
organisations from both the statutory
and voluntary and community sectors
(VCS). An implementation plan was
agreed and a Multi-Agency Steering
Group was formed in 2005 to take
forward the Strategy.
1.9 A combination of factors create a
positive environment for prisoner
resettlement in Northern Ireland.
It is a small jurisdiction with only
three prisons and most prisoners are
incarcerated close to their homes.
It has the lowest per capita rate of
imprisonment in the UK. There are
also singular criminal justice agencies
with high staff/prisoner ratios and close
liaison between the prison and
probation organisations. In addition
Northern Ireland spends much more on
imprisonment. In 2009-10 Northern
Ireland’s cost per prisoner place cost
was £77,831, though an 82% occupancy
level meant the actual cost per prisoner
was £94,804. This compared with the
England and Wales cost of £45,000;
Scotland’s £41,724; and the Republic of
Ireland’s £64,350.
1.10 Northern Ireland’s prison population
has had positive resettlement outcomes
in the past.The PBNI began working
with the VCS in the early 1980s to
provide innovative schemes such as
Prison Link which delivered practical
services for prisoners’ families. It
recruited ex-offenders to undertake
rehabilitation and diversionary projects
in the community, while simultaneously
studying to gain qualifications that would
enhance their employability. Many
prisoners returned to society better
educated, socially aware and began to
contribute to the greater good of their
communities; and few re-offended.
Although these outcomes were for a
different prisoner population, they
also reflect the importance of strong
communities – which still exist in
Northern Ireland – in aiding prisoner
resettlement.
Recent resettlement findings
1.11 The CJI inspection of Northern Ireland’s
Prisoner Resettlement Strategy in 2007
found the concept of resettlement was
well-established and the model for
delivery was largely appropriate, but
that resettlement was a low priority
overall within the NIPS. The Strategy
depended heavily on the VCS, activity
was often piecemeal and other statutory
providers needed to be more engaged.
1.12 Of the recommendations that were still
relevant to the NIPS in early 2011, our
assessment is that six (including the
establishment of a Resettlement Team
at Hydebank Wood, reducing security
classifications and introducing
resettlement leave) were fully or
partially achieved. Eight had not been
achieved – these included better delivery
of Offending Behaviour Programmes
(OBPs); the introduction of a personal
officer scheme; and re-locating women
prisoners to a different site.
1.13 The most recent inspections of
resettlement in individual establishments
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by CJI and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Prisons (HMIP) have found the following:
• Maghaberry (2009) -
‘The prison was not performing
sufficiently well. There were inadequate
programmes, prisoners had little
awareness of resettlement services, and
a clearer strategy for lifers was required.
There was good work on helping men to
retain family ties.’
• Magilligan (2010) - ‘Resettlement
outcomes were reasonably good, though
there was little strategic direction.’
• Hydebank Wood and Ash House
(2011) - ‘Outcomes for prisoners were
reasonably good. The Offender
Management Unit was well established
and increased resources received to
implement the new Criminal Justice
Orders had benefitted resettlement
work generally.’
1.14 Other recent perspectives on the NIPS
resettlement performance have included:
• the Independent Monitoring Board
(IMB) Annual Reports. The Reports
for 2009-10 were complimentary of
the NIPS resettlement activity at
Maghaberry and Magilligan, and critical
at Hydebank Wood/Ash House;
• the Prisoner Ombudsman had not
received any complaints specifically
about resettlement, but there
were several representations about
prolonged lock-ups and other
regime restrictions that impacted
negatively on resettlement; and
• the NIPS Prisons Review Team’s
Interim Report, published in February
2011 was highly critical of
resettlement efforts to date.
1.15 In December 2010, the NIPS completed
a self-assessment of achievement against
all 57 resettlement recommendations
made by oversight bodies since 2007.
The self-assessment confirmed an
inclination to measure its own inputs
rather than outcomes for prisoners.
It showed that many resettlement action
plan activities were only initiated in
2010, and were still ongoing or due for
completion in 2011. The assessment
could demonstrate plenty of activity but
only limited achievement since June 2007.
1.16 The self-assessment recognised that
strategic oversight and needs
assessments were still not fully in place
either at local or corporate levels,
and resettlement was not viewed as a
core function within residential areas.
It explained that future development
of resettlement services will depend
heavily upon the pending new
Resettlement Strategy, and the impact of
reduced finance was highlighted as an
important factor. The self-assessment
concluded that ‘There are considerable
areas of work that need to take place to
move resettlement forward within the
NIPS...’
The Northern Ireland prison population
1.17 Although the prison population has
risen steadily since 2001-09, Northern
Ireland still has by far the lowest rate
of imprisonment in the UK (89/100,000
of the population). This contrasts
with England and Wales’ 153/100,000,
Scotland’s 152/100,000 and the Republic
of Ireland’s 99/100,000.4
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4 International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College London April 2011.
1.18 Tables 2 and 3 show that a large
proportion of prisoners were on
remand (55% of prisoners in Maghaberry
compared to only 16.5% of prisoners in
England and Wales). This presents
serious impediments to the delivery of
effective resettlement services as
there are limits to what the criminal
justice system can properly do with
un-convicted prisoners. Remand
prisoners are focused on their
forthcoming case rather than on
resettlement, their prison life is
interrupted by court appearances, and
the duration of their stay cannot be
predicted due to the possibility of
receiving bail or being acquitted at court.
1.19 Northern Ireland imprisons more
people for fine default than neighbouring
jurisdictions and they are a significant
burden on prison administration. They
spend an average of only four days in
custody so it is almost impossible to
do anything useful to address their
resettlement needs during that time.
CJI’s March 2010 inspection report
on the enforcement of fines made
10 recommendations. None of the
recommendations were directed at the
NIPS, but it would benefit considerably
from their implementation by reduction in
the high committal rate for fine default.
Scope for reform
1.20 It has been acknowledged at political
level that alternatives to custody need
reform. The 2010 Hillsborough Castle
Agreement committed to review
community sentences to ensure there
was a sufficiently wide range of disposals
available to the judiciary to enable them
to deal effectively with adult offenders
convicted of less serious offences.
The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland)
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Table 3:Total Prison Receptions in Northern Ireland 2009-106
Remands Sentenced Fine Immigration Total
to immediate Defaulters Detainees
custody
Male 2,346 1,635 1,355 65 5,401
Female 120 143 28 9 300
Total 2,466 - 43% 1,778 - 31% 1,383 - 24% 74 - 1.3% 5,701
Table 2:Average Prison Population in Northern Ireland 2009-105
Remands Sentenced Fine Immigration Total
to immediate Defaulters Detainees
custody
Male 471 908 21 4 1,404
Female 21 22 2 0 45
Total 492 - 34% 930 - 64% 23 - 1.6% 4 - 0.3% 1,449
5 The Northern Ireland Prison Population in 2009, NISRA Bulletin 2/2010.
6 Ibid.
8Order 2008 provided for Supervised
Activity Orders (SAOs) as an alternative
to imprisonment for fine default. The
PBNI consequently included a SAO
introduction in its 2010-11 Business Plan
and prepared a pilot project. However
it did not commence due to cost
constraints. In February 2011, the
Department of Justice (DoJ) initiated a
working group on fine default and a
paper is to go to the Criminal Justice
Board during 2011, which is intended
to be followed by public consultation
leading to final proposals and more
legislation.We recommend the DoJ
should ensure that Supervised
Activity Orders and other
initiatives to divert fine defaulters
from custody are commenced by
December 2012.
1.21 Statistical measures of sentence
effectiveness suggest that community
sentences are more effective and
cheaper than custody in tackling
re-offending by adults convicted for
less serious offences. The one year
re-offending rate for adult offenders
in Northern Ireland sentenced to
community disposals in 2007 was
significantly less for Community Service
Orders (23.5% at a unit cost of £4,200)
and Probation Orders (24.4% at a unit
cost of £2,000) than custodial discharges
after sentences of less than six months
(40.2%).
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A comparison of all England
and Wales short custodial sentences
(under 12 months) and court orders in
2007 showed that court orders were
more effective by seven percentage
points at reducing one year proven
re-offending rates than custodial
sentences of less than 12 months for
similar offenders.8
1.22 While detention in prison prevents
offending for the duration of the
period in custody and the prospect
of imprisonment may deter some
offenders, short sentences provide
little opportunity for rehabilitation or
reparation to victims. They add to the
strain of life for the prisoners’ family
and come at a high financial cost.
Community sentences could provide
an opportunity to work with offenders
who do not pose a risk to the public
on addressing offending behaviour and
making reparation, without incurring the
high costs of custody.
1.23 The challenge for politicians and
criminal justice agencies is to increase
public confidence in the effectiveness of
community sentences and reduce levels
of unnecessary imprisonment. If fine
defaulters were removed and the
number of remand prisoners reduced to
the same level as elsewhere in the UK,
then the scope for staff to engage more
effectively in resettlement work with
prisoners would be dramatic. CJI’s first
avoidable delay report described
Northern Ireland’s justice system as
‘chronically slow...the scale of the remand
population is a persistent and damaging
drag on the capacity of any system to
deliver rehabilitation...’
9
It made several
recommendations for improvement
which, if implemented would make a
major contribution to improving delivery
of resettlement services within our
prisons.
1.24 The Government issued an important
Green Paper for consultation in
December 2010. It pointed out that
‘A relatively small number of highly
prolific offenders are responsible for a
7 The Northern Ireland Prison Population in 2009, NISRA Bulletin 2/2010.
8 Compendium of Re-offending Statistics and Analysis, Ministry of Justice 4 November 2010.
9 Avoidable Delay - A thematic inspection of delay in the processing of criminal cases in Northern Ireland, CJI May 2006.
9disproportionate amount of crime. Recent
evidence suggests there is a group of
around 16,000 (which equates to around
500 in Northern Ireland) active offenders
at any one time, who each have over 75
previous convictions. On average they have
been to prison 14 times, usually for less
than 12 months, with 9 community
sentences and 10 fines…’10
1.25 The Green Paper considered abolishing
short sentences as some other countries
have effectively done. However it
concluded that the UK…‘will not end
short sentences…particularly for recidivist
criminals who have not responded to
community punishments or fines…We will
base our plans on increasing competition,
decreasing control…and paying by
results.’ Four pilot schemes are to be
established. The schemes will not be
permitted to select the offenders
with whom they work, and it will be
instructive for Northern Ireland’s
criminal justice system to observe and
learn from their success in meeting the
twin challenges of effective resettlement
and profitable operation.
10 Breaking the Cycle – Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders Ministry of Justice, December 2010.
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The strategy for delivering resettlement
services in Northern Ireland
CHAPTER 2:
Strategic oversight of resettlement
2.1 Inspectors heard that between
publication of the previous inspection
report in June 2007 and commencement
of the CJO in May 2008, there was
very little inter-agency oversight of
resettlement at strategic level.The
Multi-Agency Steering Group only
met twice during that time; and the
proposed Ministerial Group on Reducing
Offending, which was to be led by the
then Northern Ireland Office (now
the DoJ) never materialised because
devolution of criminal justice was
pending. The NIPS deployed four
different heads of resettlement from
operational governor and civil servant
grades between 2007-11, and some of
these post holders carried additional
responsibilities. All this suggested that
resettlement was a relatively low
strategic priority, both at departmental
level and within the NIPS.The
Resettlement Unit had previously
benefitted from the contribution of
seconded PBNI personnel and the NIPS
should continue to encourage external
perspectives on this area of its work
whenever possible.
2.2 There was however ongoing engagement
in relation to specific issues, for
example, a senior NIPS official was a
member of the South Eastern Health
and Social Care Trust (SEHSCT) Reform
and Modernisation Board, co-chaired the
NIPS/SEHSCT Partnership Board and
met routinely with Department of
Employment and Learning (DEL) officials
to consider prisoner employability
issues.
2.3 The NIPS suggested it would be better
for strategic oversight to be exercised
by existing operational groups that
managed specific aspects of
resettlement. A total of 26 existing
inter-agency groups, at various levels of
seniority that had responsibility for
oversight of the resettlement pathways
were identified. Among these groups
were hostel managers, an employability
steering group, the NIPS/SEHSCT
partnership to develop prisoner health
care, the Ministerial Group on Safer
Custody, the Chaplains Advisory Board,
the Public Protection Arrangements
Northern Ireland (PPANI) and the
Regional Child Protection Committees.
2.4 None of these groups had anything
other than a piecemeal view of
resettlement; and certainly none
had, nor was likely to want overall
responsibility for resettlement services.
None of them could lever the necessary
levels of action by criminal justice and
other organisations across the wide
spectrum required.
2.5 The existence of so many steering
groups means it is understandable
that nobody would want yet another.
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However, it is very important to
properly engage non-criminal justice
departments and the VCS at strategic
level, and to ensure that resettlement
for non-CJO prisoners and remandees
does not get lost in the OM process.
The VCS makes a significant contribution
to prisoner resettlement, but in the
absence of an oversight group they feel
even more excluded at strategic level
than when we inspected in 2007 and
they do not feel they are treated like
true partners. We recommend a
high level resettlement oversight
group should be re-established by
the NIPS by December 2011
comprising themselves, the PBNI,
relevant Government departments
andVCS providers. It should meet
at least annually and should apply a
specific focus on the resettlement
of non-CJO and remand prisoners.
The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland)
Order 2008
2.6 Commencement of the CJO has
required a major shift in how the NIPS
delivers many of its services. The Order
aims to increase public protection,
ensure custody is reserved for those
who merit it, provide compulsory
supervision following custody for
sentences greater than 12 months and
strengthen management of offenders in
the community.
2.7 Judges were given greater powers to
address both the crimes committed and
the risk the offender might pose in
future. Assessment of risk was placed
at the heart of the system and every
sentence of more than 12 months would
now include a period of supervised
licence after release. This represented a
major change for the PBNI as Northern
Ireland previously only had a small
number of post-custody licences.
The CJO added significantly to the range
of provisions available. These included:
• Extended Custodial Sentences and
Indeterminate Custodial Sentences
introduced for dangerous sexual
and violent offenders. These allow
prisoners posing a risk of serious
harm to be detained indefinitely or to
the end of their extended sentence;
• Determinate Custodial Sentences
applied to all other sentenced
prisoners. Sentences of longer
than 12 months are to be served in
full without remission, with the
remainder of the overall sentence
term spent under supervision in the
community; and
• the Parole Commissioners role was
extended to assess the suitability of
dangerous offenders for release, and
to review decisions on recall of
licensed prisoners to custody.
2.8 The NIPS received an additional £5
million to assist with implementation
of the CJO during 2008-11. A probation
manager was seconded to help design
arrangements and standards for
delivering the requirements of the
Order. Two probation officers had
also been seconded to the NIPS
headquarters to assist with a range
of policy development including the
Women’s Strategy. The NIPS
subsequently located its Women’s
Strategy lead advisor in Hydebank
Wood. This was a positive move as it
connected NIPS policy-making more
closely to operations, partly remedying a
deficit which Inspectors have criticised in
the past.
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2.9 Significant supporting architecture was
introduced by the NIPS in conjunction
with the PBNI and the DoJ to deliver
the CJO requirements. A Steering
Group, Programme Implementation
Team and Programme Executive were
established; and an Offender
Management Practice Manual was
introduced to provide operational
standards and guidance.
2.10 Performance indicators were identified
and detailed projections were prepared
to anticipate impact on the custody
population. Intermediate aims included
swifter license revocations, greater
compliance with curfews and the most
dangerous offenders not being released
until demonstrating they no longer
posed a threat.Terms of reference
for a longitudinal study and a benefits
realisation plan which postulated a
13% reduction in serious crime over
five years were also prepared.
2.11 Delivery of the new sentencing
framework was therefore a key element
of the Corporate and Business Plans for
both the NIPS and the PBNI. Minutes of
the CJO Implementation Board showed
good collaborative working between
these organisations. While traditional
probation roles in prison – committal
interviews and responding to prisoners
requests – were retained, the emphasis
of PBNI’s Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) with the NIPS shifted to public
protection, risk assessment, delivery
of offending behaviour programmes
(OBPs), preparation of reports for the
Parole Commissioners and case
management.
2.12 All of the NIPS ongoing resettlement
activity was integral to the new OM
arrangements. The CJO meant the NIPS
now had to provide, and prisoners had
to accept, a range of interventions that
could demonstrate suitability for safe
release. Consequently the existing
resettlement teams were subsumed
within the OM arrangements, and where
resettlement teams had not previously
existed, OM Teams were set up with
delivery of resettlement programmes as
a core aspect of their function.
Inter-departmental collaboration
2.13 The strategic view of the NIPS and its
criminal justice partners was that
prisoners should be treated as citizens
in all respects apart from loss of their
liberty. This was one of the principles
that led to the transfer of prisoner
health care from the NIPS to the
SEHSCT in April 2008.
2.14 The main Government departments
with responsibility for services to
prisoners were the DoJ, (the NIPS’
sponsoring department), the
Department of Employment and
Learning (DEL, which dealt with
employability and training), the
Department of Social Development
(DSD, which dealt with social security
benefits and accommodation) and the
Department of Health, Social Services
and Public Safety (DHSSPS, which
provided health care and social
services). Their contributions were
mainly in kind. For example, the DSD’s
Social Security Agency and the Northern
Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) had
protocols with the NIPS to train staff in
understanding and prioritising the needs
of prisoners and their families.
2.15 Despite such protocols it could be
frustrating for the NIPS when policies
operated by external departments or
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agencies did not fit with their needs.
For example, if a prisoner had no
release address then the Housing Rights
Adviser would submit a homeless report
to the NIHE. However, the prisoner
could not be allocated accommodation
prior to release, as the NIHE policy
stipulated the person had to present as
homeless on discharge. When all other
options had been exhausted this made
successful resettlement difficult, and
meant there were high numbers of
homeless discharges from the prisons.
2.16 The quality of departmental engagement
with prisoner resettlement was mixed
for other reasons. Inspectors were told
how the NIPS resettlement priorities
were reflected to varying degrees in
the plans of partner departments and
that prisoners were often not really
considered as ‘citizens first’ in the
provision of services. Prison health care
staff suggested that community health
services sometimes tried to exclude
difficult people, such as some offenders
because they were often challenging and
intractable cases.
2.17 Others were reported to have no
strategic relationship because they
required payment which the NIPS was
unable to provide. For its part the NIPS
could not always deliver, for example,
they felt uncertain about asking DEL to
take over provision of education and
vocational training while they
themselves could not provide sufficient
prisoners on time due to staffing and
regime problems. We recommend
the DoJ should set and lead on an
objective to improve cross-
departmental contributions to
prisoner resettlement during the
2012-13 business year.
2.18 The value of political support for
resettlement was apparent in other UK
jurisdictions. The Welsh Assembly had
provided a guarantee of accommodation
for released prisoners; and there was
evidence that a new public service
agreement which required local
authorities to assist in reducing
offending, had made some English local
authorities take a more positive role in
offering housing to ex-prisoners.
2.19 There were some interesting pilot
initiatives in England and Wales that the
NIPS and its partners should consider:
• In 2010 the Home Office made
£500,000 available for seedcorn
grants to encourage the VCS to take
on a more enhanced and equal role
in designing and delivering offender
management locally. Rather than
treating this as a centrally driven
project, the Home Office was using a
national VCS umbrella body to
develop and fully administer the
grant process. It was an innovative
approach and early outcomes were
encouraging; and
• it was announced in June 2010 that
the consortia which won competitive
tenders to design, build and manage
Belmarsh West and Maghull prisons
would include two voluntary
organisations (Turning Point and
Catch 22) to provide resettlement
services in the prisons.
Pathways - a Strategy for the
resettlement of offenders in Northern
Ireland
2.20 The 2008-10 Pathways Strategy was the
base document for resettlement. It set
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out seven ‘pathways’ (accommodation,
education, health, drugs and alcohol,
finance, children and families, and
attitudes, thinking and behaviours) that
needed to be addressed in order to
reduce offending. The Strategy had
targets but it was unclear whether they
were ever measured. It was non-specific
and responsibilities were not allocated,
so accountability was impossible.
2.21 The resettlement targets focused on
delivery volumes rather than on
outcomes for prisoners. The Strategy
lacked an overall needs profile as a basis
for resettlement interventions and to
which local profiles could be linked. Yet
most of the required data was available -
it therefore should not be difficult to
analyse and compile into a corporate
profile.
2.22 A new resettlement strategy had been
under development for a considerable
period of time but publication had
been delayed pending the final report
of the NIPS Prisons Review Team.
The December 2010 draft restated
the seven original Pathways and added
two additional ones:
• supporting offenders who have
been abused, raped or who have
experienced domestic violence; and
• supporting offenders who have been
involved in prostitution.
2.23 The latest draft set a better context
than its predecessor and emphasised
that offenders should be able to access
mainstream services, but it still had
significant gaps.We recommend the
new Resettlement Pathways
Strategy should incorporate a needs
profile and identify managerial
responsibilities and timescales.
It should include SMART targets
that are based upon outcomes for
prisoners rather than NIPS inputs,
and should link to individual
establishment resettlement
strategies and to other relevant
NIPS strategies, especially the
Offender Management model.
2.24 Considerable energy was being invested
in a plethora of other NIPS strategies
which impact upon prisoner
resettlement. They included strategies
for Women Offenders, Juveniles, Child
Protection, Prisoners’ Families, Learning
and Skills, Healthcare, Foreign National
Prisoners, Employability, Diversity,
Accommodation, Drug and Alcohol
and the Progressive Regime and Earned
Privileges Scheme (PREPS). These
strategies all need to incorporate the
basic principles outlined in the
recommendation above, particularly the
focus on outcomes for prisoners rather
than NIPS inputs, if they are to prove
meaningful.
NIPS public commitments to
resettlement
2.25 The NIPS publicised resettlement
achievements and plans on its website, in
Annual Reports, Business and Corporate
Plans. They included the following:
• the 2009-10 Annual Report indicated
that resettlement plan targets were
exceeded during the previous year,
and constructive activity targets had
been exceeded for remand and
sentenced prisoners;
• the 2010-13 Corporate Plan outlined
an intention to increase work with
partner agencies to assist
resettlement processes; to address
the risks posed by domestic violence
and hate crime perpetrators; and
develop the range and consistency of
Offending Behaviour Programme
(OBP) delivery;
• the 2010-11 Business Plan set specific
resettlement objectives as follows:
- 70% average attendance at learning
and skills;
- 100% of prisoners to be assessed
for accommodation needs;
- 75% of those identified homeless
to be provided with appropriate
accommodation on release;
- 600 prisoners to be referred to
Jobtrack; and
- 150 time served prisoners to have
employment on release, of whom
25% have actual employment at
release.
At the time of this inspection it was not
yet known if these targets had been
achieved.
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The NIPS estate
3.1 The NIPS estate was small, comprising
just three prisons plus the Prisoner
Assessment Unit (PAU) – a low security
facility in Belfast for a small number of
life and long-term prisoners approaching
the end of their sentence. Much of
the accomodation was inadequate for
facilitiating good staff/prisoner
engagement. It was particularly
unsuitable that adult women prisoners
continued to be held in a male Young
Offenders Centre (YOC). There was
no open prison and it was therefore
regrettable that the NIPS had suspended
all activity at the PAU in April 2011
to allow an investigation into incidents
that had caused concern, with the
consequence that the prisoners who
had been there were returned to
closed conditions at Maghaberry.
3.2 The NIPS Estate Strategy had
commissioned a survey of sites to
replace Magilligan Prison. A total of
28 sites were identified but only one
of these was deemed suitable. The
preferred option for new build was a
private finance initiative. The PAU
was in poor physical shape although
development plans envisaged a 60 bed
step-down unit adjacent to Belfast city
centre. As there is no open prison in
Northern Ireland it will be particularly
important for a step-down facility to be
retained in the Estate Strategy. At the
time of inspection, it was unclear
whether finances would be available
to fully deliver these elements of the
NIPS Estate Strategy.
3.3 Distance from home could be an
impediment to successful resettlement,
especially for women and juveniles. A
total of 38% of the 85,000 prisoners in
England and Wales were held more than
50 miles from their home and the Social
Exclusion Unit (SEU) reported in 2002
that ‘one quarter men and half women
received no visits from their family’. The
smaller scale of Northern Ireland means
this is less of a problem, though both
Magilligan and Maghaberry are difficult
to access by public transport.
Prison regimes
3.4 The regimes in Northern Ireland’s
prisons were very limited. Activities
and classes often represented what the
prison could provide rather than what
prisoners needed. There was little
prioritisation of prisoners’ needs to
ensure they attended the correct
programmes and activities. Many
programmes started late and finished
early, and were further diminished by the
Prison Officers Association withdrawals
of ‘goodwill’ for several months during
2009 and 2010.
3.5 All of this has been exacerbated by poor
staff deployment and management, which
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was articulated in CJI’s December 2010
report on corporate governance within
the Northern Ireland Prison Service.
High rates of sick leave and
inappropriate local working practices
prevailed. An average of only 28 hours
from a prison officer’s 39 hour working
week was spent on front line duties; and
the low status of resettlement on
‘diminishing task lines’ led to OM staff
being frequently redeployed, which
called into question whether the NIPS
really regarded rehabilitation as a core
activity.11
3.6 The PREP Scheme was designed to
motivate prisoners to participate in
sentence planning and as an incentive for
better conduct. PREPS review meetings
had been initiated to oversee the
process and provide checks and
balances. Religious imbalances were
monitored and prisoners who had been
reduced in regime level were offered
opportunities to accelerate their return
to a higher level via individually-tailored
programmes.
3.7 CJI has recently reported separately on
the NIPS contribution to the Public
Protections Arrangements Northern
Ireland (PPANI) and made
recommendations for improvement.
An important lesson to emerge from
recent inspections in England and Wales
has been that prison security departments
there are responsible for public
protection work in most prisons. This
was proving problematic as security
personnel were culturally unwilling to
share information with other agencies - a
basic tenet of good public protection
work. That practice should be avoided in
Northern Ireland.
18
Structures and staffing
3.8 There is a clear structure for delivery
of OM and resettlement services. The
NIPS Resettlement Unit had transferred
from headquarters to Maghaberry Prison
in 2010. This was a sensible move: by
placing the unit close to operations it
helped reduce the sense of headquarters
remoteness from the establishments
which has frequently been criticised by
operational personnel. The
Resettlement Unit currently comprised
two civil servants who worked closely
with OM staff and guest agencies that
were based in the prisons.
3.9 Offender Management Units (OMUs)
were introduced to English prisons in
late 2006, three years before Northern
Ireland. The models were virtually
identical, though in some respects it was
easier for Northern Ireland prisons to
work effectively because of the smaller
scale. For example, few English prisons
had links with local probation trusts
whereas in Northern Ireland there was
only one probation service which had
close links between custody and field
teams. External organisations reported
they were well integrated within OMUs
in Northern Ireland’s prisons and that
there had been considerable
improvement since the last resettlement
inspection.
3.10 However, things were not so good in
another respect. Some prison officers
outside the OMUs were disparaging
about their roles or failed to see the
benefits; and OM prison officers were
frequently redeployed when other duties
received higher priority. An example can
be found opposite.
11 An inspection of corporate governance arrangements in the Northern Ireland Prison Service, CJI, December 2010.
3.11 The NIPS began to establish OMUs in
each Northern Ireland prison from April
2009. Each was overseen by a governor
and comprised various grades of prison
officer, probation officers,VCS
personnel, chaplains and NIPS
psychologists. All sentenced CJO
prisoners were allocated a sentence
manager (prison officer) and a case
manager (probation officer) who would
work together to regularly review and
manage the prisoner through their time
in custody. Their roles included risk
assessments, delivery of interventions,
compilation of parole dossiers, ensuring
release arrangements were made and
preparing licences for post-release
supervision. They were supported by
casework administrators and programme
facilitators.
3.12 Magilligan had an integrated OMU since
2006 and it was the model upon which
the other OMUs were based. Dedicated
office accommodation was provided at
Hydebank Wood and Maghaberry as
their teams were established.
3.13 The OM/Resettlement organisational
charts showed a total of 175 personnel
were engaged in this area of work: 61 at
Maghaberry; 59 at Hydebank Wood; and
55 at Magilligan. Almost 50% of this
group were not NIPS employees. A total
of 40 were from the VCS and 41 from
the PBNI. This reflected a dependence
by the NIPS on external agencies to
deliver its offender management and
resettlement services, but it also showed
an increasing openness to external
intervention in the closed prison world.
3.14 The NIPS officers in the OMUs were
volunteers who had elected to
undertake these roles. Their motivation
was high and the group included many
long-serving officers who opted to work
‘domestic shifts’. Everyone commented
positively upon the benefits of sharing
their open plan accommodation. Several
prison officers noted heightened levels
of job fulfilment, while others were
encouraged by the common value base
among team members from different
disciplines.
3.15 Operational managers and staff said
there had been very good preparation
for the introduction of the OMUs, with
large numbers trained in the CJO
provisions. Detailed job descriptions
were available for the NIPS OM staff,
and their training was much better than
that of other prison officers. Some of
the training was accredited and there
was a considerable amount of shared
training with partner agencies on topics
such as parenting, housing rights, benefits
and the Duke of Edinburgh’s and
Endeavour Awards. This represented a
major improvement on prison officers’
standard fare of control and restraint
and firearms training.
Future challenges
3.16 The NIPS and the PBNI felt that the
OM model was functioning satisfactorily
in custody during its early stages, but
recognised the growing numbers of
prisoners would challenge their capacity
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There was only one Family Officer at
Magilligan. His work was valued by
prisoners and their families and he found
the role fulfilling. However his post was on
the Diminishing Task Line - which was a
contradiction of the NIPS Family Policy -
and he was frequently redeployed.This
meant that child-centred visits were often
cancelled, sometimes at short notice.
to deliver the full range of resettlement
services. Indeed recalled prisoners were
already generating a lot of work. In
total, since the new arrangements were
introduced on 12 April 2011, 138
offenders had been released on licence
having served the custodial element of
their sentence in full. Of those, there
had been 58 requests to recall offenders
representing a recall request rate of
42%. This had resulted in 45 offenders
(41 Determinate Custodial Sentences
and four Extended Custodial Sentences)
being recalled to prison. Of the 45
recall decisions, 19 re-offended while on
licence and 26 breached their licence
conditions. A total of 33 were recalled
within three months of their release.
The standards set clear commitments
and timetables for reporting to the
Parole Commissioners in respect
of recalled prisoners. This was a
comprehensive process with which the
NIPS only previously had to engage in
respect of life prisoners, but now
recalled CJO prisoners required a
similar level of input.
3.17 The pressure is likely to increase
as the NIPS Strategic Efficiency and
Effectiveness (SEE) programme envisages
considerable staff redundancies by the
end of 201112; and there are warning
signs for the OMUs. In August 2010
governors had been asked to provide a
list of “rehabilitative services/interventions
which NIPS provide but are not required by
legislation.” It was also concerning to
hear of a “discretionary rehabilitation”
view that was voiced at senior level
within the NIPS.
3.18 Despite these negative indicators, prison
managers insisted the OM model was
here to stay. The Maghaberry governor
declared that, notwithstanding a £2.5
million cut in his 2011-12 budget the
OMU would not be affected; and the
governor at Hydebank Wood explained
that while staffing had reduced by 70
and his budget reduced by £4 million
since the 2007 resettlement inspection,
he was “Precious about protecting OM
because HydebankWood holds three of the
most vulnerable categories in custody -
women, juveniles and young men.”
3.19 Table 4 shows there were a total of 528
sentenced prisoners in custody on 4
May 2011 who were eligible for the OM
process: 324 CJO prisoners and 204 life
prisoners. They represented 48% of the
sentenced population and 32% of the
total prisoner population on that date.
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Determinate Extended Indeterminate Lifers Total
Custodial Sentences Custodial Custodial
Sentences Sentences
Maghaberry 93 30 1 184 308
Magilligan 127 19 2 4 152
Hydebank Wood 41 6 0 8 55
Ash House 2 2 1 8 13
Total 263 57 4 204 528
Table 4: Current CJO and life prisoner cases (as of 4 May 2011)
12 See Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Justice Official Report (Hansard), 9 June 2011.
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Short-term and remand prisoners
3.20 With the numbers of CJO and life
prisoners steadily increasing, and
recalls at a higher rate than had been
anticipated, the NIPS was well aware
of the risk that short-term and remand
prisoners could lose out. The data
below illustrates some of the practical
challenges in engaging short-term
prisoners in meaningful resettlement
activity:
• during 2009-10, 67% of sentenced
receptions into prison had sentences
of one year or less;
• of 441 short-term prisoners in
Magilligan during 2010, 276 had
already been on remand in custody
for an average of 43 days; 77 of them
had spent more than half their
sentence on remand; and they had an
average 87 days left to serve, ranging
from three to 183 days. In addition all
had their custodial period interrupted
by transfer from Maghaberry.
3.21 In an attempt to engage effectively with
short-term and remand prisoners, the
NIPS had dedicated five Magilligan
officers to non-CJO cases; and all
remands were offered resettlement at
Hydebank Wood. A 2011 survey of
60 short-term prisoners at Hydebank
Wood showed that 58% had a
resettlement plan, and 87% had received
a joint committal/discharge individual
interview that was specifically developed
at Magilligan to address the issues posed
by short stays in sentenced custody.
3.22 This data highlights the importance of
the NIPS continuously striving to ensure
parity of input and resourcing between
CJO/life prisoners and short-term
prisoners and remandees. We
recommend the NIPS should set a
SMART target to extend the case
management processes to a wider
range of prisoners, particularly
short-term prisoners and
remandees who regularly return
to custody.
3.23 A probation manager confirmed that
while things had improved in terms
of resettlement there were still
insurmountable difficulties: “Some very
good work was being done on housing and
benefits advice...Fewer people are slipping
through the net...However, it is very difficult
to provide for those who are released at
court or shortly afterwards due to lengthy
remands.”
3.24 Inspectors heard of a specific difficulty
in relation to foreign national prisoners
who were due for release. The UK
Border Agency frequently only notified
their decision about deportation to the
prisoner and to the NIPS on the last
day of sentence. This made it impossible
for the prison to design a release plan,
especially if a hostel application was
required, and much nugatory effort
could be invested in such cases. We
recommend the UK Border Agency
should provide a minimum of four
weeks notice to the NIPS of their
decision about whether or not
prisoners will be deported at the
end of their sentences.
Voluntary and community sector (VCS)
involvement
3.25 While the VCS felt excluded from
strategic oversight of resettlement,
things were better at operational level.
Service level agreements existed for
all the NIPS major guest organisations.
It was ironic that they were more
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outcome-focused than many of the NIPS
own strategies, and they spelled out
specific targets, reporting arrangements
and costs. The position of some
agencies had been consolidated since
the last inspection. Alcohol and drugs
programmes were now provided by a
single organisation - Adept - which was
providing a more consistent service and
feedback to the NIPS. The Housing
Rights Service reported its position was
much more secure and it was “no longer
firefighting.”
3.26 There were still examples of VCS
partners being poorly treated. For
example meetings were cancelled at
short notice when NIPS OM personnel
were unavailable due to redeployment.
Inspectors saw minutes of regular
meetings between the NIPS
Resettlement Team and VCS
organisations, and heard examples of
accountability being exercised in both
directions which enabled these types of
problem to be aired, but they did not
always have successful outcomes.
This was exacerbated when VCS
organisations had been responsive to
requirements of the NIPS. The Northern
Ireland Association for the Care and
Resettlement of Offenders (NIACROs)
Jobtrack had been re-configured and staff
were being redeployed to suit the NIPS
expectations, but it struggled to operate
effectively because prisoners’ criminal
records which were provided by one
governor were later withdrawn by
another. We recommend that
criminal records and other
information should be made
available, where relevant and with
suitable protections built in, to
partner agencies engaged in
providing services to the NIPS.
3.27 With 40 personnel located in the three
prison establishments the VCS
contribution was significant. An added
benefit was that they could generate
significant amounts of extra money
which would not otherwise come into
the Northern Ireland justice system.
For example, NIACRO received
approximately 40% of its funding from
criminal justice agencies, and acquired
the balance (£2.3 million) from other
sources. This contributed important
resources to the criminal justice system
that would otherwise have been
unavailable.
Local management and oversight of
resettlement
3.28 In addition to central oversight of
OM and resettlement there was a
considerable amount of management
activity at local level. Maghaberry’s
Resettlement Policy was dated
November 2009. It emphasised
retention of family links and partnership
delivery of services, but was aspirational
and bland, and lacked data or a needs
analysis. It was non-specific in its
commitments and there were no
timescales for task completion nor
allocation of responsibilities. It did not
set any targets because it said they were
spelled out elsewhere, and links with
relevant entities such as PPANI were
unclear.
3.29 There were no minutes of Resettlement
Committee meetings available. Rather
these matters were dealt with in a
variety of other fora such as an Activities
and Services Strategic Meeting, a Local
Programmes Steering Group, an
Interventions and Referrals Panel and an
Internal Prisons Programmes Group. In
essence, there was no regular strategic
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3.34 HydebankWood had a Resettlement
Strategy for 2011-14. This was a
detailed document which represented
major improvement since the last
inspection. It specified resettlement
needs of both young men and women
prisoners. It also included older women
prisoners and foreign nationals, though
there was nothing specific about life
prisoners. The Strategy set out how
services were to be delivered; and
prisoner needs were articulated within
a context of background research
and legislation. There were named
personnel with responsibility for
delivering all resettlement and OM
roles. The Strategy did not have SMART
objectives nor arrangements for review.
There was also a separate, detailed Ash-
Inspire booklet which set out a range of
provisions for women prisoners.
3.35 While the recently-prepared Strategy
was an improvement, effective local
oversight of resettlement was still not
taking place at Hydebank Wood. Minutes
showed their Steering Group had only
met sporadically since 2009, there were
no terms of reference and when the
group did meet, representation was
consistently unavailable from several
departments.
3.36 The recent inspection report on OM
in England and Wales found similar
inconsistencies. The level of resources
available to work with prisoners varied
considerably from prison to prison.
In most cases, insufficient relevant
resources had been allocated to work
with risks of harm and re-offending.
Offender supervisors lacked ability to
complete or analyse prisoner
assessments and management checks
did not always pick up these failings.
Some probation services were doing less
oversight of resettlement at Maghaberry.
3.30 Magilligan had a comprehensive local
Resettlement Strategy, and its Local
Programme Steering Group had met
15 times since the last resettlement
inspection. The minutes reflected better
focus than at Maghaberry - which was to
be expected in a smaller prison with a
more stable population comprised
entirely of sentenced prisoners.
3.31 There was evidence that Magilligan had
attended to recommendations made in
its March 2010 inspection. For example
a resettlement needs profile was
completed; sentence plans were now
being quality controlled; and a money
management course had been
established - completion of this course
was a prerequisite for prisoners who
were being assisted to open bank
accounts.
3.32 The January 2011 Magilligan Prisoner
Needs Analysis was based upon a survey
of 450 prisoners. It quantified levels of
need, referrals, starters and completers
on all programmes, and contained
explanations for non-achievement.
It assessed the previous years
performance, concluding that 81% of
(615) released prisoners’ needs had
been met by the time of release.
3.33 Magilligan produced a programme
prospectus which was based on the
needs identified, and it outlined the
programmes available in the prison and
a calendar for their delivery, by start and
finish dates, location, number of weekly
sessions, staff involvement, demand on
staff and other resources. All of this
represented a significant advance since
the 2007 CJI Resettlement inspection.
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since the introduction of the
OM model in 2006.13
3.37 Comprehensive processes were in place
to monitor OM progress. Weekly
Managers Performance Meetings had
become the significant driver of OM
activity in each NIPS prison. These
meetings dealt with CJO case
progression, focusing particularly on
report availability for the Parole
Commissioners and ensuring cover
for staff leave so that assessments and
programmes could be delivered on
schedule.
3.38 Managers Performance Meetings
commenced in May 2010. Business
Performance Teams were established
in each prison and were producing
detailed daily reports. Interventions
Panels oversaw programme delivery and
worked to ensure availability of staff to
prepare assessments and reviews and
deliver programmes.
3.39 These meetings had access to a wide
range of detailed performance
indicators. The NIPS Prisoner Record
Information Systems Management
(PRISM) facility had undergone major
re-design and was beginning to generate
more detailed population profiles and
measures of achievement. Functional
areas and themes involving both staff
performance and prisoner outcomes -
such as complaints, sentence plan
progress, average unlock times,
personnel sick leave, programmes
delivery and healthcare data - were now
measurable. Prison managers were
enthusiastic about the new PRISM
functionality and capacity to improve
performance and accountability.
3.40 These postulated improvements will
need to be realistically-based as past
NIPS performance measures have been
quite meaningless in some respects.
For example CJI’s 2010 inspection of
corporate governance within the Prison
Service found that, whereas the NIPS
reported an annual cost per prisoner
place as steadily declining over the past
five years, a different and more realistic
calculation (the cost per occupied place)
by Inspectors revealed it was some
£16,000 higher than suggested.
Constructive activity and attendance rates
3.41 The 2009-10 NIPS Annual Report
reported that constructive activity
targets had been exceeded for remand
prisoners (10 hours targeted, 13 hours
achieved per week) and sentenced (20
hours targeted, 20.6 achieved per week).
However, this was within a NIPS
definition of ‘constructive activity’ that
was wide-ranging and easy to achieve:
‘All pursuits that play a part in the
enhancement of the individual’s skills,
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour, or
contribute to a reduction in the likelihood
of re-offending (including attendance at
court).…For separated prisoners time out
of cell will count as constructive activity.’
3.42 Many NIPS prisoners were ‘employed’ as
wing orderlies. This was a very limited
role which entailed little meaningful
activity or stimulus. On February 8
2011 Maghaberry had 329 prisoners
(41%) employed from a population of
796. A total of 190 (58%) of the
employed prisoners were orderlies.
3.43 The March 2010 Magilligan inspection
found that: ‘Attendance by prisoners in
13 Prison Offender Management: a joined-up sentence? HM Inspectorates of Prisons & Probation March 2011.
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education classes was too variable and
generally poor, with only half the places
filled…The demand for vocational skills
programmes was high. However attendance
was poor, often less than 50%.’14 The
shortfalls were mainly due to inefficient
management of timetables and staff not
prioritising prisoner attendances rather
than prisoners failing to attend of their
own volition.
3.44 The 2011 Hydebank Wood/Ash House
inspection showed that capacity in the
vital area of learning and skills was
significantly underutilised: most classes
had less than five learners, average
attendance was 50% and there were
serious staff shortages.
3.45 Comparison with English and Welsh
prisons shows they had 24,000 work
places for 85,000 prisoners, which
represented less than one third working
at any point in time. This low activity
rate was further reduced in April 2008
when HM Prison Service reduced the
core week by half a day for prisoners in
order to deliver efficiency savings. On
the other hand, 1,500 prisoners in the
open estate went out to work in full-
time paid employment on day release.
Northern Ireland’s closest equivalents
were Foyleview and the PAU, though
neither of these was a proper open
prison.
Resettlement boards
3.46 Resettlement boards were the formal
forum for engaging prisoners in planning
and reviewing their sentence plans.
Prisoners were invited to attend and
most came along.The practice varied
between establishments:
• Magilligan - all prisoners who had
five months or more left to serve
were required to attend their
resettlement board. If they declined
the offer was renewed at a later stage;
• Maghaberry - policy was to board
sentenced prisoners after three
months, and life prisoners had annual
reviews; and
• HydebankWood - all new
sentenced and remand committals
were expected to attend a
resettlement board within four weeks
of arrival.
3.47 HMIP’s 2008-09 Annual Report
recorded that in England and Wales
‘... coherent custody planning for the
majority of short-term and remanded
prisoners, often serial re-offenders, has if
anything declined with the emphasis on
providing offender management for a
minority. ’ This is an obvious risk that
must be avoided in Northern Ireland.
3.48 Resettlement boards usually convened
weekly. In those that Inspectors
observed, there were active efforts to
involve prisoners and the tenor was
positive and well-intentioned. However
staff sometimes failed to really
understand the prisoners’ perspective,
and were more focused on formalities
such as obtaining prisoners’ signatures to
indicate consent to resettlement. There
was considerable scope to improve the
‘meaningful’ aspect of these events.
3.49 As an example, at one board, while
the tone was considerate, Inspectors
witnessed a prisoner point out an
inaccurate education assessment (the
assessor thought the prisoner was
illiterate and had not gleaned he had
already completed GCSEs); and
14 Report of an Announced inspection of Magilligan Prison, HMIP and CJI September 2010.
panellists failed to grasp the primary
reason for him being in custody –
which was a local feud. In these
circumstances, it was up to the prisoner
to steer the agenda if resettlement was
to have any value. The prisoner in this
case was clearly motivated and clarified
these matters. However, other prisoners
at the same board declared they were
“Not sure why I’m here” and “I’m not
interested.” They signed plans, but
obviously did not believe they were
relevant to their time in custody.
3.50 The NIPS had previously outlined an
intention to involve prisoners’ families in
the resettlement boards. Some efforts
had been made in this direction but they
met with very little success. The NIPS
was able to provide examples of one-off
situations where prisoners’ families had
come into the prisons and helped the
resettlement process and other aspects
of prison life. However they were
doubtful about whether routine family
involvement was practical at
resettlement boards. Inspectors believe
a family perspective could considerably
assist the resettlement process for more
prisoners. We recommend the
NIPS should set a SMART target to
annually increase the numbers of
prisoners’ families that contribute
to the resettlement process.
Resettlement plans
3.51 The purpose of resettlement boards
was to agree plans that would assist the
prisoner through their sentence and in
preparation for release, and these plans
should be reviewed and updated on a
regular basis. For those prisoners who
did not have a resettlement plan, the
model suggested they should receive
assistance in relation to basic needs
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such as health care, accommodation and
benefits advice before being released.
3.52 Sentence plans had become an integral
part of the PREPS process in a
deliberate attempt to stimulate
prisoners to comply with their plans
and actively participate in the process
of risk reduction.
3.53 The NIPS continued to resist
recommendations for introducing a
personal officer scheme on the basis
that as part of the SEE programme all
remaining staff would be trained to
engage positively with prisoners. Any
such initiative will need to take account
of the learning derived from the Officer
Development Programme that was
delivered in 2008. It aimed, but failed
to deliver precisely the culture change
among the bulk of staff that is once
again being mooted. It was increasingly
the case that sentence managers fulfilled
aspects of the role, and indeed many
CJO prisoners told us they knew their
sentence managers and most found
them helpful in delivering their plans.
3.54 While some plans had improved, quite
often there was no explicit connection
between their various elements nor
proper sequencing of the elements
contained in the plans. Developing
these links should be exactly the
function of personal officers, but most
prisoners described the situation as
“hit and miss.” Sentence managers were
noticeably more pro-active with their
CJO prisoner caseloads in this respect.
This was a welcome development
which needs to be expanded. We
recommend that the NIPS SEE
programme should ensure
prisoners have an officer who takes
a personal interest in their case.
This ought to be introduced on a
phased basis for example starting
with life prisoners and extending
to long-term remand prisoners.
3.55 While Maghaberry’s resettlement policy
framework and oversight were poor,
it had initiated a pilot scheme in
December 2010 to assess all new
committals, including remandees in
relation to housing, benefits and debt.
A total of 210 such prisoners were seen
during the first month and referred on
for support where necessary. It is very
important that this practice should
continue so that short-term prisoners
without resettlement plans do not lose
out as increasing attention and resourcing
is focused upon CJO prisoners.
3.56 Twenty working days were required to
prepare a resettlement plan. For
prisoners this usually meant there would
be at least four weeks lack of activity at
the start of their period in custody as
there were delays in identifying work,
training and educational needs and
opportunities. If the sentence was only
imposed after a lengthy period on
remand in custody, prisoners with early
discharge dates had little opportunity
for engaging seriously in resettlement
planning.
3.57 The NIPS Annual Report 2009-10
showed that resettlement plan targets
were exceeded for determinate
sentenced (94.9% achieved against
87% target) and life sentenced (99.7%
achieved against 97% target) prisoners.
The same targets were repeated in the
2010-11 Business Plan. The rates of
achievement were very high, but they
masked deficiencies in the quality of
some plans as well as inadequacies in
the targets.
3.58 Inspectors viewed 45 resettlement files.
Their overall quality was better than at
the last inspection in terms of the
amount of information included, inputs
from partner organisations and
frequency of review. Assessments and
plans were generally up to date.
3.59 However the content focused more on
what the NIPS could provide rather than
on what the prisoners actually needed,
several reflected a pre-occupation with
ticking boxes and simply (re)-stated
existing risks and needs. In addition to a
personal officer type approach, some of
the deficiencies could be remedied by
more directive chairing of resettlement
boards and a more outcome-focused
minuting style. NIPS meetings and
minutes that Inspectors observed were
often inconclusive and failed to direct
anyone towards SMART outcomes or
allocation of responsibilities. We
recommend the NIPS should train
staff to apply a more directive
chairing and minuting style for
individual casework and committee
level meetings, incorporating
SMART objectives with built-in
accountability.
3.60 CJO prisoners’ files contained better
quality recording than others. Some
had very good entries by NIPS officers
and comprehensive reports for the
Parole Commissioners. In Maghaberry
Inspectors saw good examples of risk
scores that had reduced significantly
following interventions. This was
exactly the type of meaningful
measurement that should be extended.
3.61 Resettlement interventions and OBPs
were core components of resettlement
and the OM model.
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Resettlement interventions
3.62 Resettlement interventions addressed
topics such as money and benefits
management, substance misuse and
addictions, housing, employment,
parenting and coping with bereavement
and troubled relationships. Perhaps
because they largely dealt with personal
development of the prisoner, they were
invariably described as more attractive
by prisoners than the OBPs which
they felt compelled to undertake.
Consequently interventions generally
had higher levels of referral and uptake.
3.63 Interventions were predominantly
delivered by VCS agencies, though prison
officers were increasingly involved.
Organisations such as NIACRO, Extern,
the Housing Right Service, Samaritans,
Cruse Bereavement Care, Barnardos and
Relate had staff based in the prisons to
deliver the interventions. In some cases
prisoners who had been accredited as
peer mentors assisted with delivery of
the programmes.
3.64 Trained prisoners were able to provide
peer support as reading assistants,
Listeners and tutors. This was beneficial
for both recipients and providers.
However the potential of these schemes
was considerably under-developed
because security considerations
frequently prevented prisoners’
access to deliver the services. We
recommend the NIPS should set
targets to annually increase:
• the number of prisoners who
receive accreditation for peer
support roles; and
• the number of hours spent
undertaking these roles.
3.65 Employability interventions were
significant for prisoner resettlement.
NIACRO’s Jobtrack programme targeted
600 prison-based referrals per year, and
participants had relatively successful
outcomes with 44% of completers
entering employment compared to
10% who left the programme early.
NIACRO also ran 15 ‘Meet the Employer’
events in prisons. The future challenge
in this area will be to find new forms of
employment and increase numbers into
education and training in a changing
economy.
3.66 Prisoners in their last three months of
sentence were offered a pre-release
programme. The programme provided
assistance and advice with regard to
housing, social security benefits, access
to job search and completion of CVs.
The NIPS had also arranged for bank
accounts to be opened for prisoners as
part of pre-release preparation, subject
to undertaking a money management
programme.
Offending Behaviour Programmes
(OBPs)
3.67 OBPs are a central plank in reducing
the risk of re-offending by prisoners
and the need for them has been further
increased with the introduction of CJO
sentences. They are carefully designed
and accredited which means staff must
be trained in their delivery and
prisoners must meet criteria in order
to undertake the programmes. There
has been longstanding debate about
eligibility criteria for participation in
OBPs and their effectiveness. Ministry
of Justice research indicated that one of
the most common programmes –
Enhanced Thinking Skills – which
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addresses thinking and behaviour
associated with offending ‘was effective
at reducing the one year reconviction rate
by six percentage points when compared
with a group of other similar offenders who
were not on the programme.’15
3.68 Prisoners’ eligibility to participate in
OBPs depended upon a variety of
factors such as literacy levels,
acknowledgement of guilt, time left to
serve, risk levels and educational
attainment. This led a NIPS Programmes
Steering Group to query whether the
Sex Offender Treatment Programme
(SOTP) was the correct programme
since 83 of the 91 sex offenders who
were referred in Maghaberry during
2009-10 were deemed to be either
unsuitable or unable to participate.
Such data clearly begs the value of high
eligibility thresholds and suggests a
more pragmatic approach is needed.
3.69 The ongoing problem in providing
programmes was denying prisoners an
opportunity to prove they have
addressed their offending behaviour.
CJI recommended in the recent PPANI
inspection report (published June 2011)
that ‘The NIPS should strengthen its
Offender Behaviour Programme delivery
structure, develop programmes for deniers
and improve its Offender Behaviour
Programme database.’ The NIPS accepted
the rationale for this recommendation
but added the caveat that it could only
be delivered with sufficient resources.
However the challenge is for the NIPS
to use existing resources more
productively, rather than seeking extra
resources which are highly unlikely to be
available to an already over-staffed
prison service in the current financial
climate. It is also unreasonable that a
corporate risk is transferred from the
NIPS to the PBNI if prisoners are
released onto supervised license
without having been offered appropriate
interventions. There are more pragmatic
ways to increase OBP participation
levels without compromising integrity.
We recommend that prisoners
who deny their current offences
should, where possible undertake
programmes in respect of previous
convictions; more usage of rolling
programmes should be introduced
to increase participation levels; and
challenging targets should be set
for completion of programme
suitability assessments.
3.70 Operational managers highlighted
obvious, and in some instances
longstanding gaps in the menu of OBPs
that was available. We recommend
the NIPS should extend its range
of OBPs to include a domestic
violence programme, an internet
sex offending programme and a
programme for dangerous drivers.
3.71 There were increasing concerns about
failure to provide OBPs and it is
probably significant that the NIPS
2010-11 Business Plan stated individual
establishment targets for OBPs would
be set locally – presumably because it
was simply too difficult to commit to
firm corporate targets in this important
area. The needs of the Parole
Commissioners and PPANI for
programme delivery and prison
psychology reports were not always
being met, and it was embarrassing for
15 Compendium of Reoffending Statistics and Analysis, Ministry of Justice, 4th November 2010.
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the NIPS that they could sometimes
only agree with the legitimacy of
prisoners’ complaints and cynicism.
several people told us there was scope
to manage the existing complement of
NIPS psychologists more effectively as
well as devising more expeditious
methods of programme delivery.
We recommend the NIPS should
set SMART targets to more
expeditiously deploy and manage
its psychology personnel.
3.74 Inadequate OBP provision was not
unique to Northern Ireland. The joint
inspection by HMIs of Probation and
Prisons said: ‘The level of provision of
accredited programmes was inadequate to
meet the range and frequency of the needs
of sentenced prisoners, particularly sex
offenders and domestic violence perpetrators
overall. Even though needs analysis were
more up to date, in most establishments
decisions about which programmes to offer
had been made years earlier and were
sometimes no longer relevant to the current
profile of prisoners.’16
3.75 Detailed data was available to
demonstrate prisoner attendance rates
at interventions and OBPs, though it was
difficult to distinguish between them.
It appeared however that attendance
was generally better at interventions
than at OBPs. Maghberry had an
average 74% attendance rate across
interventions such as AA,Alcohol
Management, Barnardos, Drugs
Awareness, Duke of Edinburgh, GOALS,
Jobtrack and Stepping Stones in 2010.
3.76 Other important factors that impacted
significantly on prisoner resettlement
were healthcare, security classification
and home leave.
16 Prison Offender Management: a joined-up sentence? HM Inspectorates of Prisons and Probation March 2011.
A Magilligan prisoner was refused home
leave because he had not done the Alcohol
Management course. Yet he had been on
the waiting list for over a year and the
course was still not being offered to him.
3.72 Besides prisoner eligibility problems,
recruitment, retention and deployment
of psychologists were also central to the
NIPS OBP delivery problems. Only a
chartered forensic psychologist could
fulfil the role of treatment manager and
sign-off psychology assessment reports.
In March 2011, there were 24 vacancies
out of a total target psychologist staffing
level of 46, and only 4.8 of those in
post were forensically qualified. Various
attempts at resolution, including
recruitment of 20 psychology assistants
in 2009 and development of a forensic
psychology course at local universities
had so far been unsuccessful. By 2010
it had reached the stage that some
psychological assessments had begun to
be contracted out to a private company
based in England; and by February 2011
several of the assistants had left the
NIPS for more lucrative employment
elsewhere.
3.73 In addition to the recruitment of
psychology assistants and paying for
external consultants, the NIPS had made
other efforts to improve delivery of
OBPs, including establishing a
Programmes Steering Group. However
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Health care
3.77 A NIPS policy suggested ‘It is recognised
that due to the negative lifestyles many
offenders lead, the majority of prisoners
have the physical health of an individual
on average ten years older.’ Hydebank
Wood’s Resettlement Strategy identified
that ‘21% of sentenced prisoners in
Northern Ireland are likely to have been
known to community mental health services
prior to committal...and 65% will have
some type of personality disorder. Many
will have led very chaotic lifestyles...’ The
prison population was ageing - at the
time of this inspection the NIPS held 13
prisoners over the age of 60 - and 10
prisoners were registered as disabled.
3.78 Health care was an area where the
concept of prisoners being treated as
citizens remained far from realisation.
CJIs December 2010 inspection report
on the NIPS corporate governance
highlighted strategic and operational
concerns pertaining to health care.
When responsibility for prisoners’
health care shifted from the NIPS to the
SEHSCT in April 2008, prison staff did
not transfer as intended due to trade
union resistance on their behalf. This
meant that potential benefits such as
joint training were not realised. Prison
health care staff were not subject to the
same clinical governance and supervision
as community health care professionals.
They were isolated professionally and
unable to be rotated into posts outside
the prisons.
3.79 While there were some notable
exceptions and variations between
establishments, feedback from prisoners
and the NIPS about health care was
predominantly poor. Governors felt
frustrated that they could not resolve
issues which were managed by the
SEHSCT. Hydebank Wood had lost
valuable services when cognitive
behaviour therapy and aromatherapy
were terminated by the Trust.Two
Discharge Nurses had been appointed
to help manage mentally ill prisoners
across the NIPS estate but nearly all
their work was at Maghaberry.
Many of the difficulties centred on
communication problems and medical
confidentiality.
Popular programmes such as the Duke of
Edinburgh's and Endeavour Awards in
Maghaberry had high levels of participation.
Current enrolments in March 2011 totalled
236, including 88 lifers and 19 staff. There
was imaginative use of opportunities for
accreditation in the prison setting. A total of
22 bronze awards and three silver awards
had been completed to date.
A Sentence Manager, Probation Officer and
community SocialWorker were given three
different versions of the diagnosis and
treatment plan for a juvenile prisoner with a
suspected facial tumour.
A prisoner who had self-harmed was brought
back from hospital and placed in his cell.
However medication that had been prescribed
and given to him by the hospital doctor was
withheld until the prison doctor saw him.
Security classification
3.80 An internal NIPS review in November
2006 suggested the security
classifications of 50% of Northern
Ireland’s prisoners could be down-
graded.A total of 11% at that time
were classified as high risk compared
to just 1.3% in England and Wales.
Subsequently a new classification model
was introduced. It resulted in 9% of the
population being classified as high risk,
34% as medium risk and 57% as low
risk.
3.81 This represented some progress but
the full benefits of reduced security
classifications were nowhere near being
delivered. Almost all the high risk
prisoners were held at Maghaberry,
and the entire prison continued to be
managed in accordance with procedures
appropriate to them. The Category A
population consisted mainly of separated
Republican and Loyalist prisoners,
seldom more than 50 in total, who were
held in very secure conditions. The
practical implications of maximum
security were that many prisoners were
restricted in where they could work and
there was no unescorted movement,
which tied up large numbers of staff.
The limitations were not just apparent
at Maghaberry, but also at Magilligan
where too many prisoners remained at
Category B security level; while at
Hydebank Wood there were implicit
restrictions in managing male and
female populations on the same site.
We recommend the NIPS should
set targets to reduce security levels
and deliver a more liberal regime
for lower security prisoners in each
of its prisons.
Transfers
3.82 Transfers within and between prisons
could be very disruptive, not just for
prisoners, but also for their families and
visitors, as well as for professionals who
were engaged with the prisoner. Much
work undertaken in Maghaberry was
ultimately nugatory in areas such as
risk assessment and sentence planning,
family links, health care and education
when prisoners were moved. It was
also very frustrating for prisoners when
assessments and programmes were
repeated after being transferred.
3.83 An average 53 prisoners were transferred
from Maghaberry to Magilligan each
month in a pragmatic exercise to
optimise use of available bed spaces, and
weekly boards were held to decide who
should move. Recent increases in the
prisoner population may accelerate this
trend. The boards took account of
standard criteria including bed spaces,
security, health and pending charges, and
resettlement staff participated. However
security concerns overrode everything
else and resettlement staff felt the
transfer board did not take serious
account of their views. There had
nonetheless been progress since the
last inspection, as improved electronic
recording provided a more consistent
approach to transfer of prisoners’ files.
3.84 The NIPS resettlement self-assessment
acknowledged ‘Currently transfers and
allocations are decided upon to meet
constraints due to the available estate and
the need to accommodate an increasing
number of prisoners...’One way of dealing
with this would be to allow sentenced
prisoners to be committed directly from
court to Magilligan. This would reduce
duplication of work such as committal
interviews, help prisoners to settle
more easily, and provide continuity with
regards to staff and service provision.
We recommend the NIPS should
determine and apply criteria that
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would enable sentenced prisoners
to be committed directly to
Magilligan.
3.85 The NIPS also transferred life and long-
term prisoners to the small PAU facility
in Belfast towards the end of their
sentences. The PAU was in poor
physical shape and when prisoners
were out at work during the day there
was considerable staff downtime which
represented a waste of resources.
However it was an improvement that
greater clarity had been introduced to
the arrangements for transferring
prisoners to and from the PAU, though
of course everything was in abeyance
since its closure in April 2011.
Home leave
3.86 Home leave made an important
contribution to resettlement. The
process was carefully structured and
managed with set eligibility criteria to
apply and for approval to be granted.
Risk assessments were provided by the
PBNI for each application, and home
leave would be refused if prisoners did
not engage with their sentence plan.
There were approximately 2,500
applications during 2009-10, of which
79% were successful, with higher ratios
granted to female prisoners and young
offenders.
3.87 The NIPS also provided resettlement
leave for specific events such as job
interviews or community-based exams
and tests; and Christmas home leave
was available - 53 prisoners received
Christmas home leave in 2010 and
70 applications were refused.
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Outcomes of the Northern Ireland
Prison Service resettlement services
CHAPTER 4:
4.1 A considerable amount of background
documentation and data about NIPS
inputs, policies and strategies was
available for this inspection. However
all this was of little value if it did not
produce meaningful outcomes for
prisoners.The importance of prisoners
having positive resettlement outcomes
is simply that if they are better
rehabilitated then the likelihood of
future victims is reduced.
4.2 It was intended that the new OM
sentence planning process and the
Parole Commissioners requirements
would encourage prisoners to address
their offending behaviour while in
prison. Discussions with individuals and
groups of prisoners, and other feedback
such as Prisoner Forum minutes yielded
important insights. They suggested a
range of factors that impacted on their
motivation and ability to become
engaged with resettlement services.
They included the following:
• many, especially remand prisoners and
appellants were pre-occupied with
their court case and prospects of
obtaining bail, the sentencing outcome
or likelihood of a successful appeal;
• short-term prisoners primary focus
was on getting released, and ideally
on receiving home leave in advance
of release;
• long-term prisoners had to cope with
their sentence. Some aspects of
resettlement - mainly interventions -
were viewed as supportive in this
regard while OBPs were more to be
endured, though necessary to prove
they were safe to release;
• separated Republican and Loyalist
prisoners were concerned about the
intensive security levels that applied
to their detention;
• although most sentenced prisoners
whom we interviewed were aware
of their sentence plans and said they
had been involved in their
preparation, many expressed a
lack of understanding about what
resettlement would actually achieve
for them;
• minutes of Prisoner Fora showed the
main concerns raised by prisoners
involved group living arrangements
and regimes - issues as diverse as
lengthy and frequent lock-downs,
communal punishments, availability
of kettles, cost of telephone calls
and tuck-shop items, and slow mail
delivery. None contained any specific
reference to resettlement services;
• some prisoners were fearful for their
safety in prison: 15 of the 95 sex
offenders in Maghaberry in January
2011 were held in protective
conditions, while some of the others
isolated themselves by spending most
of the time in their cells;
• prisoners also suggested a range of
other priorities that took precedence
over resettlement:
- undergoing adjudication/cellular
confinement – 622 adjudications
were commenced in respect of
prisoners sentenced to less than
six months in 2010;
- health problems and medical
treatment (Magilligan had 237
external hospital appointments
during 2010; and made 158
referrals for opiate addiction and
33 for alcoholism);
- open Supporting Prisoner at Risk
(SPAR) processes to help prevent
self-harm (414 SPARs were opened
in Maghaberry in 2010); and
- disgruntlement because of
(perceived or actual)
discrimination or low regime
levels (Magilligan averaged
25 PREPS demotions each month
and Maghaberry averaged 122
adjudications each month between
July 2007 - January 2011).
4.3 Some prisoners who had been refused
release by the Parole Commissioners
felt there was no point in trying to
prove themselves any more. They also
resented being ineligible for home leave
or transfer to Magilligan’s Foyleview and
Alpha units until close to their ‘long
date’ as the prison could not pre-empt
Commissioners’ decisions.
4.4 Prisoners were increasingly aware of the
significance of their risk assessments,
which carried considerable weight in
determining home leave outcomes and
post-release accommodation. The PBNI
said the majority of complaints that they
received from prisoners related to risk
assessment scores.
4.5 ‘Ordinary’ prisoners in Maghaberry
expressed disgruntlement (with which
prison managers agreed) at their
unequal treatment in comparison to
separated prisoners: “The separated
prisoners are out each day 8am - 6pm, yet
we are regularly locked down at 4.20pm.
This is a two tier jail....Their Standard
regime is far better than our Enhanced
regime.”
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Collective punishment rankled and had a
negative impact:
When a dongle was found in Maghaberry
in December 2010 it led to loss of all
computer access across the estate for
every prisoner.This thwarted education
programmes, including for life prisoners
who were undertaking Open University
courses.The issue had still not been
resolved by May 2011.
When the PAU was temporarily closed in
April 2011 all the prisoners based there
were immediately brought back to
Maghaberry and had their pre-release
programmes interrupted as a result.
4.6 The significance of all these perspectives
is that staff have to firstly appreciate
the prisoners’ view of their situation.
Secondly, they need to motivate and
help them to successfully navigate the
frustrations that are inherent in prison
life. Motivational interviewing was an
attribute in which few NIPS personnel
had been trained, indeed it ran contrary
to the prevailing security culture. Only
a minority of prisoners will ever be
pro-active self starters - the majority
will require significant encouragement
and direction. We recommend the
NIPS should provide motivational
interviewing training, initially for its
OM staff; and subsequently as part
of any cultural change programme
for the wider body of staff.
4.7 The NIPS commissioned two research
studies at Hydebank Wood in 2010,
seeking prisoner views about aspects
of life there including resettlement.
Feedback was generally reported as
positive. A high number of respondents
had met someone to discuss
resettlement, though only a minority
knew their resettlement targets or felt
they were helped to prepare for release.
This was considered due to lack of
awareness, poor communication and/or
inadequate provision.There was a more
positive response from the adult female
prisoners than from the young men.
4.8 A follow-up survey elicited more
positive views, which was considered
due to a new induction programme that
had been introduced. However there
was still confusion, particularly about
terminology. Information overload was
identified as an issue and new notice
boards were designed to try and clarify
communication. The follow-up report
also stated: ‘There was also some
confusion around sentence plans and if they
had their own copies, most did but did say
they had thrown them away. It would
therefore be important that copies are
attached to the wing file for staff reference.’
Outcomes for women prisoners
4.9 Women prisoners in Northern Ireland
were still held on the same site as
young male prisoners, a fundamentally
unsatisfactory situation. Inspectors
heard from a manager that “women
are still viewed as a bolt-on to the boys,”
making it difficult for cross-site functions
such as catering, home leave and
resettlement boards to apply a female
focus when most of the emphasis was
on the larger population of young males.
4.10 However there had been improvements.
The PBNI and the NIPS had established
the INSPIRE Project in 2008 to address
the needs of female offenders, including
women prisoners. A popular and
well-used extended visits facility was
introduced. Volunteers were allowed
onto landings to provide practical
services such as Indian head massage,
card-making and cooking with some
of the more challenging prisoners.
Women’s Groups visited Ash House
weekly where they provided practical
support by linking women to normal
services in their own communities for
example taking a released woman to her
daily methadone clinic. Ash House had
its own dedicated OM personnel and it
was reported that they were better
integrated than elsewhere on the
Hydebank Wood site. Despite these
local improvements, it remained
fundamentally unsuitable that women
were held on the same site as young
male prisoners. We again
recommend that women prisoners
should be accommodated on a
separate site from young male
prisoners.
Outcomes for child prisoners
4.11 It was encouraging that, following a
policy reversal in 2009, no girl under
the age of 18 has since been held at Ash
House - they are now all detained at
Woodlands Juvenile Justice Centre (JJC)
which provides a much more suitable
environment. However the same policy
reversal was not applied to under 18-
year-old boys, of whom there were on
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average 19 in the YOC at any point in
time; and there is a high rate of child
committals to the YOC - 92, representing
74 individuals between December
2010 – January 2011, of whom:
• 71 were remanded;
• 14 were sentenced.Their sentences
averaged six months, with a range
of 2-30 months; and
• seven were fine defaulters, all serving
seven days in lieu of fine payment
(the JJC could not legally take fine
defaulters).
4.12 The NIPS is focused on managing an
adult population with a custodial rather
than parental model, and it has faced
significant criticisms of its provision for
children at the YOC. Children held
there are among the most troubled and
needy in society, yet they have a poor
regime with lengthy periods of lock up
and little opportunity for education or
rehabilitative activities.
4.13 Pressure for complete removal of all
children from the YOC led to
establishment of a ‘Quadripartite’ group
(the NIPS, the Youth Justice Agency
(YJA), the PBNI and the DoJ) in
September 2009, the result of a
ministerial initiative to review and
develop custodial arrangements for all
child offenders under the age of 18. A
series of principles and related actions
were identified and implementation
commenced centred on four key areas:
• development of a YJA-type case
management system in the Young
Offenders Centre. This is based on
individualised assessments and
application of the ‘best interests’
principle. It commenced in July 2010;
• engagement with sentencers, Social
Services, the Police Service of
Northern Ireland and the Northern
Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service
to reduce PACE and custodial
remands, particularly for children
from the care system;
• deliver closer linkages between the
YOC and the JJC through staff
placements; and
• a wider review of custodial
sentencing arrangements as part of
the review of youth justice.
4.14 A YOC Juvenile Improvement Plan led
to 36 recommendations for improving
all aspects of children’s regimes and
target dates for completion. Practical
outcomes included:
• a JJC case management model was
introduced for children held at the
YOC, initially led by JJC personnel;
• a new system of planning meetings
was developed. It incorporated a risk
assessment process and a decision
about best placement for the child. If
appropriate, recommendations would
be made to courts for a change of
location from the YOC to the JJC;
• although it contravened the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, children at the YOC were
allowed to mix with adult prisoners
after acquiring parental consent, so
that a wider range of opportunities
could be provided for them;
• several YOC managers and staff
undertook placements at the JJC
to learn about their approach to
management of child custody; and
• the YJA Bail Support Scheme was
extended to the YOC.
4.15 A total of 33 planning meetings were
held between July 2010-March 2011.
They led to nine recommendations for
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transfer to the JJC, all of which were
granted by courts. Inspectors heard
about readily apparent benefits of
transfers from YOC for example a child’s
reading age increased by three levels
within a short space of time (this is not
surprising as the JJC provides 25 hours
education per week compared to two
hours per week at the YOC); another
was removed from the risk of physical
assault by other prisoners; and
bereavement counselling was provided
at the JJC for a boy who had been using
drugs to cope with his grief while in the
YOC.
4.16 However Steering Committee minutes
showed that by September 2010, there
were concerns about levels of NIPS
engagement, frequent staff changes on
the YOC juvenile landings, and
inaccurate and incomplete information
contained on children’s files. JJC staff
had been co-chairing planning meetings,
but relaxed this “due to growing
confidence of YOC staff.” Nor was it
clear to Inspectors in March 2011 that
the YJA had the “overall co-ordinating role
for all under 18 year old offenders,” which
was the Ministers expressed wish in
January 2010 when the process was
being considered.
4.17 The YOC planning process is really a
harm reduction initiative which tinkers
with a fundamentally flawed system.
There are no set criteria for children
to be moved, and the ‘best interests’
principle is too nebulous and not
measurable. Irrespective of longer term
developments, about the location for
all under 18-year-old children, the YOC
planning process needs to be improved.
We recommend that by April 2012
all male children who are sent into
custody should be treated equally
with female children i.e. their
default placement should be
Woodlands JJC; and in the interim
the JJC should take a more central
role in theYOC planning process
for children. This should include
chairing the meetings. Terms of
reference should be prepared for
these meetings whose primary
purpose ought to be to establish
the child’s suitability for transfer to
the JJC, and a robust quality
assurance process should be
introduced.
Outcomes for life prisoners
4.18 Life prisoners were one of the groups
who received high levels of OM and
resettlement input. Since the last
inspection, their progression and
regression pathways through the system
had become clearer, and they could
move to the PAU at an earlier stage
than previously. These were useful
developments.
4.19 The new Braid House opened in 2010 as
a dedicated lifer facility at Maghaberry.
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Inspectors observed aYOC planning meeting. It
was very well attended, but did not appear to
have any terms of reference and discussion
about possible transfer only came after
sentence planning - entirely predicated on the
child remaining in theYOC - was completed.
At face value the child (a 17-year-old
remandee who was out of control at home and
in custody for the first time) was a classic case
who could have benefitted from being placed
in the JJC. However he was content to be in
theYOC, had the support of a benign Class
Officer and his mother found theYOC was
easier for visiting, so he remained there.
It provided a more tranquil and brighter
environment, though there was still
scope to develop the range of
opportunities for work and education.
Five lifers had been moved to Magilligan,
primarily to be near their families and
communities. However the NIPS had
decided this would only be a pilot and
by January 2011 there were no plans
to move any other lifers. It is difficult
to understand the reason for this,
especially when some life prisoners
have successfully made the move.
We recommend that appropriate
life prisoners should continue to be
transferred to Magilligan if it helps
to meet their resettlement needs.
4.20 All eligible lifers had signed and agreed
their Life Sentence Plans, which implied
they agreed to engage with resettlement
services offered to them. Annual
reviews were being undertaken, though -
as with resettlement boards - several
prisoners needed motivational support
to engage in a meaningful way with this
process when they still faced many years
in custody. Life prisoners with whom
we spoke were anxious as they
approached Parole Commissioner
hearings. They felt frustrated when
promises about commencing
programmes were not fulfilled, existing
work and educational opportunities
were removed or basic health care
needs were not met, often for reasons
that appeared unjustified. Again these
are precisely the types of issue that a
good personal officer would attend to
by providing support and motivation that
would assist life prisoners cope with
the uncertainty they face. Several
were cynical about the value of annual
reviews and felt it was really up to
themselves to get things done as best
they could.
4.21 Seventeen prisoners received their life
licenses during 2010 and several more
expect to be considered for release
over the next five years. The NIPS
reported very good support from the
PBNI and offender hostels in helping
with this process, a view that was largely
endorsed by prisoners.
Outcomes for separated prisoners
4.22 The 2007 inspection recommended
that separated Republican and Loyalist
prisoners should have the same
resettlement opportunities as other
prisoners. The NIPS subsequently
prepared a weak and undated ‘Proposal
for enhanced access to resettlement
opportunities for separated prisoners.’
It contained three elements: a ‘Making
Good‘ desistance programme, ‘Extend
delivery of resettlement and education
within separated houses;’ and ‘Establish
education and employability links for
prisoners on release.’ No targets nor
review dates were set.
4.23 By March 2011, there had been some
progress: standard induction, education
assessments and Resettlement Needs
Profiles were being offered to separated
prisoners. Interventions such as
Barnardos parenting classes and the
Housing Rights Service were also being
provided. However, the overall NIPS
conclusion was that “Uptake of education
and resettlement opportunities by separated
prisoners so far has been disappointing.”
4.24 Apart from limited participation in
interventions separated prisoners
primary concern was about the levels of
security that applied to their custodial
detention. Interest in OBPs was
reported as limited though this was not
surprising from prisoners who did not
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feel they needed rehabilitated. The
initial ‘Making Good’ programme was
run in experimental mode during 2010
with nine Loyalist participants, from
whom it received positive feedback.
We recommend the new NIPS
Resettlement Strategy should set
specific targets for delivery of
resettlement services to separated
prisoners.
Outcomes for children and families of
prisoners
4.25 The Ministry of Justice estimated in 2007
that 160,000 children in the UK had a
parent in custody - more than were
affected by divorce. Extrapolation
provides a Northern Ireland equivalent
of approximately 2,500 children.
Research has shown clearly that children
of prisoners are substantially more likely
to end up in custody themselves, and
considerable emphasis was therefore
placed by the NIPS and its partners on
supporting the children and families of
prisoners.
4.26 Thousands of people used the visitor
centres run by NIACRO and the Ulster
Quaker Service Committee at each
prison establishment. These provided
crèche facilities, welfare advice,
transport and refreshments. The
NIPS most recent visitor survey was
published in April 2009. A total of 80%
of respondents rated the arrangements
as satisfactory or very satisfactory, and
the quality of information provided and
the visits booking system also scored
highly, while in June 2010 Hydebank
Wood was commended in an Equality
Commissioners report for ‘operating best
practice in relation to family contact
facilities.’
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4.27 Chaplains and the Family Links project
(which was delivered by NIACRO and
funded by the NIPS and PBNI) provided
valuable support to prisoners’ families.
Each prison had designated Family
Officers who provided a range of
services such as sorting out visits and
parcels, running community support
groups and organising child-centred
visits. Their roles were widely
appreciated by prisoners and their
families. Approximately 1,000 children
each year had the opportunity to spend
extended individual time with their
prisoner parent on child-centred visits,
though the number dipped significantly
in 2009 due to withdrawal of ‘goodwill’
by the Prison Officers Association; and
Magilligan had three family days
cancelled in 2010 for the same reason.
We recommend the NIPS should
set a target to increase its
complement of Family Officers
and to protect their role.
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